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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Under the European Union’s Voluntary Agreement with car manufacturers, 
average light vehicle CO2 emissions in 2004 were 12.4% below 1995 levels but 
appeared unlikely to achieve the 25% reduction needed to reach the 140 g/km 
target for “per vehicle” CO2 emissions for 2008.  The EU is now considering a 
regulatory approach to further reduce average vehicle emissions, in the form of 
CO2 emission or fuel economy standards.  Such standards have been used by 
a number of countries, including the United States (although U.S. standards 
have been little-altered since their 1975 promulgation), Japan, China, and 
several others, and those that have been in existence for some time – e.g., 
those in the United States and Japan –have been successful in achieving their 
targeted levels of new vehicle fuel economy. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine various aspects of fuel economy 
and carbon standards for light vehicles, including their rationale, methods of 
establishing stringency, regulatory structure, and timing, with the hope of 
assisting the decision process for new standards.  Because the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards adopted by the U.S. in 1975 are the 
longest-standing and most studied of the various standards now in existence, 
much of the focus of this paper will be on the U.S. standards.   
2.  DO FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS MAKE SENSE? 
Fuel economy standards for light-duty vehicles have been widely promoted 
as an effective means of reducing oil consumption and, more recently, carbon 
emissions, and justified on the basis that vehicle manufacturers and purchasers 
do not seem to properly value fuel economy improvements that would easily 
pay for themselves in future fuel savings, and do not account for social benefits 
that would arise from reductions in oil use such as improved energy security 
and reduced emissions of greenhouse gases.  
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Nevertheless, there is strong opposition to fuel economy standards, not 
only from automakers, automobile unions, and auto enthusiasts but also from 
many in the economics community.  This opposition centers around a range of 
arguments about the limitations of new standards and their impacts on oil use, 
public safety, consumer choice, vehicle markets, and the economy. 
There is an extensive base of economics literature critical of fuel economy 
standards, and this paper will not attempt to discuss it in any detail.  In 
summary, however, the two key economic arguments against such standards 
are: 
1. They are economically inefficient and have costs to consumers and 
producers that greatly exceed their benefits; and 
2. In reducing the cost of driving, they cause increased travel – the so-
called “rebound effect” -- that has externality costs (in terms of increased 
air pollution, congestion, and traffic injuries and fatalities) exceeding any 
societal benefits associated with reduced fuel use. 
The economic efficiency arguments against fuel economy standards 
generally depend on the assumption that vehicle manufacturers and purchasers 
are economically rational and that there are no significant market failures in the 
market for new vehicles.  It is argued that forcing manufacturers to build 
vehicles that are more efficient than the market demands will inevitably lead to 
market distortions and large economic losses. 
The primary counterargument to this is that, for several reasons, society 
would choose higher levels of fuel economy than will private consumers: 
1. Society places more value on future benefits than consumers do.  
Even for rational, well-informed consumers, society would choose higher 
fuel economy than private consumers will because private discount rates 
are much higher than social discount rates.  For example, Gerard and 
Lave (2003) show that society (assuming a 4% discount rate) would be 
willing to pay about $400 more than a private purchaser (20% discount 
rate) for an increase in fuel economy from 22 to 25 MPG. 
2. The net gains to consumers from increased fuel economy may be 
small even when society gains a great deal.  Several U.S. studies 
have estimated that the net benefits of fuel economy increases – lifetime 
fuel savings minus increased vehicle purchase price – are relatively small 
over a range of fuel economy increases.  In other words, although fuel 
economy increases may be cost effective, the economic reward is not 
large and consumers may be relatively indifferent to the increases – 
though society would favor increases because of their energy security, 6 
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greenhouse emissions, and other benefits.  With the large costs of 
redesigning vehicles to obtain higher efficiency coupled with the technical 
risks associated with new efficiency technologies, automakers can be 
reluctant to undertake these investments in the face of such indifference.  
Further, automakers face market uncertainty about the extent to which 
their competitors will pursue greater fuel economy or instead use their 
resources (and available technology) to increase performance, add 
luxury features, and increase vehicle size and weight.  Fuel economy 
standards reduce this uncertainty by demanding that all manufacturers 
pursue some minimum improvement in fuel economy. 
3. Consumers’ aversion to loss will tend to make them wary of betting 
on fuel economy technology, whereas society’s risk of loss is much 
lower.  The high level of uncertainty in the value to the consumer of fuel 
economy gains, coupled with the inherent loss-aversion behavior of 
consumers, implies that consumers will tend to reject bets on fuel 
economy increases.  Greene, German, and Delucchi (2007) point out 
that fuel economy benefits are inherently uncertain because fuel 
economy levels actually attained by consumers can vary over a wide 
range; future fuel prices are highly uncertain (and a fall in prices will cut 
the monetary benefits of fuel savings); and consumers don’t know with 
certainty how much driving they will do or how long their vehicles will last.  
The authors then apply loss aversion theory to show that an average 
consumer would decline an estimated fuel economy increase from 28 to 
35 MPG even though its expected net present value is $405; aversion to 
the possibility of a financial loss outweighs the greater odds of a gain in 
this case.  In contrast, society averages benefits across all vehicles and 
their drivers, reducing sharply its risk of losing the fuel economy bet. 
Further, there is ample evidence that vehicle purchasers do not behave as 
“rational consumers,” at least in terms of how economists define such 
consumers.  Surveys have shown, for example, that consumers virtually never 
attempt to evaluate the tradeoff between higher costs for fuel saving technology 
and money that would be saved from lower fuel bills (Turrentine and Kurani, 
2004), and demand extremely rapid paybacks when they are asked explicitly 
how much they would be willing to pay to save a few hundred dollars a year 
from reduced fuel use – a survey sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy 
in 2004 found that consumers wanted to recover their higher vehicle costs 
within about 2 years. 
The magnitude of the rebound in the developed economies – and its impact 
(from increased driving) on pollution, accidents effect, etc. – has declined over 
time with growing income, and recent estimates for the United States set the 
effect at about 10%, that is, a reduction in per-mile fuel costs will cause about a 
1% increase in driving (Small and Van Dender, 2004).  
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The argument that any increased travel caused by the rebound effect will 
create costs well in excess of travel benefits can be countered by noting that, 
where this is the case, it is a problem of fuel pricing and should be solved by 
adjusting prices, not by forgoing policies that address other problems.  Saying 
that increased travel creates high net costs is synonymous with arguing that 
transport fuels are seriously under priced (Gerard and Lave, 2003) or 
interventions to reduce accident or air pollution costs should be strengthened.  
This argument is especially potent in the United States, which has 
comparatively low gasoline and diesel prices because its fuel taxes are far 
lower than those in the EU countries.  Whether U.S. (or EU) fuel taxes are too 
low depends on the magnitude of externality costs, and there is little agreement 
about their magnitude.  The U.S. National Academy of Sciences estimated 
these costs at about $0.26/gallon in its 2002 examination of fuel economy 
standards (NRC, 2002), equivalent to about 1.5 cents/mile at the then-average 
fleet fuel efficiency of 17 miles/gallon; at the other end of the scale, Lutter and 
Kravitz (2003) estimated these costs at 10.4 cents/mile (even though they did 
not include costs for national security and global warming, which were included 
in the NAS estimate), equivalent to about $1.75/gallon.
i  Whichever of these 
estimates may be correct, however, one can argue that the appropriate policy 
response is not to forgo fuel economy standards but instead to correct the 
market distortions caused by under pricing of fuel.  In European markets, 
however, it is much harder to argue that the rebound effect will create costs in 
excess of the benefits of reduced fuel use -- European tax levels on transport 
fuel are higher than even the upper estimates of externality costs.   
Opponents of fuel economy standards have argued that they have caused 
terrible market distortions, pointing especially to distortions that have occurred 
in the U.S. market for new vehicles.  Fuel economy standards do distort the 
market; all regulations do, in some sense that’s their purpose.  However, the 
worst distortions that have occurred in the U.S. market appear to have been 
caused by the unusual structure of the U.S. standards (for example, the artificial 
division between cars and light trucks in the U.S. system), and most of these 
distortions should be avoidable by paying careful attention to properly 
structuring a new standard…..see the discussion below (“Structure of a New 
Standard”).   
In the United States, automakers and other opponents of more stringent 
CAFE standards have argued vigorously that the standards have seriously 
degraded highway safety.  Past studies by the U.S. National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) concluded that vehicle downsizing associated 
with the original U.S. CAFE legislation caused upwards of 2,000 traffic fatalities 
yearly (Kahane, 2003), and CAFE opponents have argued that new standards 
would force vehicle weight downwards and cause a wave of new fatalities.  This 
argument has been vigorously disputed, and an evaluation of its merits 8 
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deserves at least a lengthy paper all its own.  The primary counterarguments to 
the charge that new fuel economy standards will compromise safety are: 
o New studies that separate the effect of size and weight changes in 
vehicle safety indicate that the increased fatalities detected in the NHTSA 
studies were due to reduced vehicle size rather than reduced weight 
(Van Auken and Zellner, 2003).  These studies conclude that reducing 
the average weight of the light-duty vehicle fleet would actually lead to 
improved  safety if average vehicle size – measured by wheelbase and 
track width – remained unchanged. 
o Examination of the variation of fatality statistics across the fleet coupled 
with a focus on the combined risk of vehicle to their own passengers as 
well as to the passengers of vehicles they strike shows that vehicle 
design plays a more critical role than weight in vehicle safety (Ross and 
Wenzel, 2002) – for example: 
•  Fatality statistics for vehicles in the same weight and size classes 
vary substantially; in particular, some of the inexpensive 
subcompacts exhibit twice the risk of safer subcompacts such as 
the Honda Civic and Volkswagen Jetta.  Better-designed vehicles 
have safety records as good as their much larger counterparts. 
  Pickups and SUVs are about twice as dangerous as cars to 
vehicles that they collide with, apparently because of their high 
bumpers and rigid frames. 
o A reexamination of the relationship between light-duty vehicle fuel 
economy and highway fatalities from 1966 to 2002 (Ahmad and Greene, 
2005)  indicates that, if anything, higher fuel economy is correlated with 
fewer traffic fatalities, not added fatalities. 
It is quite certain that the argument about fuel economy standards and 
safety is not dead and will be vigorously argued in any future debate on new 
standards.  In particular, concerns may be raised about the effect on overall 
fleet safety of mixing a new generation of lightweight vehicles with their older, 
heavier counterparts.  However, arguments that fuel economy standards will 
automatically lead to reduced fleet safety should be treated with skepticism.  
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3.  HOW AMBITIOUS SHOULD NEW STANDARDS BE? 
Policymakers considering new fuel economy standards or their equivalent, 
e.g. CO2 emission standards, must consider several aspects of a new standard, 
including its numerical fuel economy targets and their timing as well as the 
structure of the standard, that is, how the targets are assigned to different 
vehicles and different vehicle manufacturers.  The magnitude of the targets is 
often the most contentious issue, but the timing and structure are equally 
important.  The discussion of fuel economy targets that follows focuses 
primarily on the U.S. fleet, and is followed by a discussion of how conditions in 
Europe may affect the setting of appropriate targets. 
It would be useful if there were a way to calculate an optimum target level 
for a new fuel economy standard.  Unfortunately, there is no such method.  
Instead, it may make sense to try a few different approaches to setting new 
standards to get a broad perspective for what options might be open to 
policymakers. 
3.1. “Cost-effective”  standards 
A common method of identifying fleet targets for a new standard is to 
identify a fuel economy level that would create fuel savings over the vehicles’ 
lifetimes that, at the margin,
ii would be greater than the added cost of fuel 
saving technologies.  For example, the U.S.’s National Academy of Sciences, in 
a recent study of fuel economy standards (NAS, 2002),  identified “cost 
effective” fuel economy gains of  12-27% (depending on vehicle size) for 
passenger cars and  25-42 % for light trucks in the U.S. new vehicle fleet.  The 
NAS targets were arrived at by establishing baseline vehicles and theoretically 
adding, one by one, a series of fuel-saving technologies in order of their cost-
effectiveness (highest first), until adding the next technology on the list would 
cost more than would be saved in reduced fuel consumption.  Using standard 
economic methods, future fuel savings were “discounted” to the present.  
Similar methods have been used by the Office of Technology Assessment in 
the early 1990s (OTA, 1991), and others.  
This method is useful for getting a general sense for what is achievable by 
available technologies, but it has several problems.  First, the method treats the 
analysis as if it had only two variables, technology cost and fuel savings.  In this 
formulation, both the vehicle designer and purchaser are simply deciding 
whether adding fuel economy technology to a vehicle is worth the cost in fuel 10 
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savings.  In reality, however, all fuel saving technologies are dual purpose – 
they can be used to save fuel, or they can be used to gain something else – 
better performance, larger size, more luxury, or even greater safety – without 
having to use more fuel.  Thus, an engine improvement that allows more power 
to be squeezed out of an engine can lead to a more powerful vehicle without 
increasing engine size, or a more fuel efficient vehicle with a smaller engine 
and the same power.  Or the vehicle designer can compromise and get some of 
each – more power and better fuel economy, but less than the maximum 
possible for each.  See Box 1 for an illustration of the tradeoff between fuel 
economy and other vehicle features.  Vehicle purchasers attach real value to 
the attributes that “compete” with greater fuel economy for the benefits of 
efficiency technology.  Consequently, asking them to forgo improvements in 
these attributes in favor of higher fuel economy won’t be “free” even though fuel 
savings may outweigh the technology costs. 
A second concern with the method is that, as noted above, there is strong 
evidence that the great majority of vehicle purchasers simply do not perform 
even rudimentary analysis of the tradeoff between higher first cost and fuel 
savings over time (Turrentine and Kurani, 2007); in other words, the method by 
which analysts estimate “reasonable” levels of fuel economy improvements 
bears little relationship to how vehicle purchasers actually value fuel economy.  
Further, when consumers respond to surveys that ask direct questions about 
how they value fuel savings, their answers imply that they want any added 
purchase cost to be repaid within just a few years.  If translated into potential 
fuel economy savings, this criterion would yield very little improvement.  For 
example, the NAS did an alternative analysis of fuel economy potential using 3-
year payback as a criterion.  The average improvement was estimated to be -3 
to 3 percent improvement for cars and 2-15 percent for light trucks (NRC, 
2002). 
A third concern is that this method has tended to focus only on currently 
available technology and generally fails to account for likely improvements in 
technology performance and cost over time, and the development of new 
technology that conceivably might play a significant role during the time period 
of the analysis (if this is 10 years or more).  This leads to conservative results, 
although these factors are hard to quantify. 
Finally, the targets identified by this method depend on fuel prices over the 
lifetime of the vehicles (highly uncertain), the discount rate chosen to represent 
the value of savings in the future (contentious), estimates of technology costs 
(hotly debated), and whether or not the value of externalities such as climate 
change damages and energy security costs – also highly contentious – are 
included in the calculation.  For example, repeating the NAS analysis using fuel 
prices more in line with recent U.S. prices - $2.00-$3.00/gallon – raises the cost 
effective increase to 30-50% for the fleet.  
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3.2.  “Top Runner” Method 
The Japanese essentially avoided this debate by setting standards based 
on the idea that vehicles that represent the “best in class” of the current fleet – 
weeding out vehicles that that are anomalous in performance or that have 
especially expensive technology – can be exemplars of what the average 
vehicle could be in 8 to 10 years.  Japan used this “top runner” method to 
identify a series of fuel economy targets for vehicles in different weight classes 
for its 2010 standards.  This represented a 22% increase in fleet fuel economy 
over the regulatory period (assuming there would be few changes in average 
vehicle weight over the period).  Although this method (or at least the Japanese 
version of it) is conservative in that it ignores the potential for newer 
technologies (such as hybrid drivetrains) to achieve reduced costs and become 
far more common, it does provide another potential fuel economy target that 
can inform the ongoing debate.  Further, the method can be extrapolated 
further into the future by conjuring up a vision of a “leading edge” vehicle, that 
is, the best mass-market vehicle that could be available a number of years in 
the future and call for the fleet average several years later to achieve the same 
fuel economy as these “top runners.”   
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has performed “top runner” 
analyses for the new 2006 U.S. car and light truck fleet (Heavenrich, 2006).  
Their analysis answers the question: “What would the fuel economy of the new 
fleet be if the current fleet were replaced by 1) the best four vehicles in each 
size class (there are nine size classes in both the car and light truck fleets), 2) 
the best dozen vehicles in each size class, and 3) the best dozen vehicles in 
each inertia weight class?”  The answer is that the car fleet would be 17-20% 
more efficient, and the truck fleet would be 14-24% more efficient.  However, 
the fleet would be somewhat slower (for the largest boosts in efficiency, cars 
would take 10.2 seconds to go from zero to 60 mph versus the actual fleet’s 9.5 
seconds, though the higher-efficiency trucks would actually shave a second off 
of their times); trucks would move sharply away from 4-wheel drive, which 
significantly reduces efficiency; the share of hybrid drivetrains would grow 
sharply, from 1.6 to 14% for cars and from 1% to 36% for trucks  (but only 5% 
for cars and 12% for trucks for the next best case, with only a 1 mpg loss in fuel 
economy); and many automatic transmissions would be exchanged for 
continuously variable transmissions and manual transmissions.  Unfortunately, 
this mixing of the effects of efficiency technology and utility-oriented vehicle 
attributes limits the usefulness of this type of analysis in setting standards – but 
it can offer a useful added perspective if interpreted cautiously. 
Let’s try to identify what the “top runners” for the U.S. fleet might be in the 
year 2020.  Over the next 10-15 years, large and small changes in the 
technology embedded in cars and light trucks could have a dramatic impact on 
fuel economy – a greater than 50% improvement in fuel economy for a “leading 12 
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edge” vehicle with conventional drivetrain, and perhaps as much as a doubling 
in fuel economy for such a vehicle with a hybrid drivetrain…..assuming that the 
technology is used primarily for fuel economy rather than for performance and 
other attributes.  To understand fuel saving technology and the potential for 
improving it, it helps to understand a bit about why vehicles need energy and 
power and how they obtain it.  This is discussed in Box 2. 
The major part of industry focus on raising fuel economy has been on the 
powertrain, but vehicle load reduction can play an important role.  As noted in 
Box 2, reducing vehicle weight through sophisticated design and use of 
enhanced materials – high strength steels, aluminum, plastics, and composites 
– has considerable leverage on vehicle efficiency because weight reduction 
reduces both inertial loads and rolling resistance losses.   The U.S. Department 
of Energy’s Vehicle Technologies Program has established the ambitious goal 
for 2015 of reducing the weight of the vehicle structure and subsystems by 
50%.
iii  However, over the past decade a considerable portion of the weight 
reduction potential of structural redesign and materials substitution has been 
used for improving vehicle stiffness and structural strength rather than for 
reducing weight.  These attributes yield consumer benefits in better crash 
protection and a more solid “feel” that is highly valued by vehicle buyers.  
Assuming that some further gains in these attributes will be sought, weight 
reductions of 20% or so may be a more realistic estimate for what might be 
achieved by 2020, assuming strong pressure to maximize fuel economy.  More 
drastic reductions might be possible if vehicle structures of carbon composites 
become practical for mass market vehicles in this timeframe.  A 20% weight 
reduction could yield a 12-14% fuel economy improvement if vehicle 
performance was unchanged. 
Improvements in aerodynamics are hard to predict because aerodynamic 
drag is closely tied to vehicle appearance, and consumer acceptance becomes 
a key issue.  However, relatively subtle changes involving smoothing out the 
vehicle’s undercarriage, reducing body gaps, and making small changes in the 
vehicle’s rear end can obtain important benefits, and the best coefficient of 
aerodynamic drag in the current fleet (0.26) is obtained by the Lexus LS430, 
which is quite conventional in appearance.  By 2020, a CD of 0.22 may be 
possible for mass-market cars with side mirrors replaced by cameras, 
continued improvements in manufacturing tolerances for body panels, 
smoothing of vehicle undersides, and careful aerodynamic design. 
Reducing rolling resistance by improving tire design and materials is also 
possible.  However, a tire’s design and materials affects not only its rolling 
resistance characteristics but also its resistance to wear and its handling 
performance, and there can be tradeoffs among these characteristics.  The first 
generation Prius had tires with a rolling resistance coefficient CR of 0.006, an 
excellent value, but consumers complained of their rapid wear and they were 
replaced with tires that were slightly less efficient but which had better wear and  
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handling characteristics.  There is little publicly available information about tire 
research; a goal of achieving widespread use of tires averaging about a 0.006 
CR should be considered an educated guess. 
Engines have improved dramatically over the past 2 decades, and they will 
continue to improve.  Recent presentations by a number of automakers and 
suppliers at the 2007 Society of Automotive Engineers World Congress 
presented a fairly unified picture of the potential future evolution of the gasoline 
engine.  Currently, the most efficient gasoline engines have direct injection fuel 
systems with continuously variable valve lift and timing on inlet and exhaust 
valves and variable intakes.  Because downsizing will yield significant benefits 
in efficiency, a “best-in-class” 2020 gasoline engine will probably use a 
turbocharger with variable geometry vanes; larger engines will shut down a 
third or half of their cylinders at low load.  Improvements in emissions control 
should allow high air/fuel ratios (“lean burn”) that will further improve efficiency, 
although this will likely require further reductions in the sulfur content of 
gasoline.  Continued improvements in valve controls and in-cylinder monitoring 
should allow use of more efficient thermodynamic cycles (than the current Otto 
cycle) under some load conditions, bringing gasoline engines much closer to 
diesels in efficiency.  Overall, efficiency gains of about 25% should be possible 
from engine improvements alone. 
Advanced direct injection turbocharged diesel engines currently are about 
30% more efficient than naturally aspirated gasoline engines of similar 
performance.  Diesels will improve further with improved combustion chamber 
designs and higher pressure injection systems, but their efficiency advantage 
relative to gasoline engines should shrink as gasoline engines become more 
diesel-like. 
Hybrid drivetrains will certainly be an important part of the fleet in 2020, but 
the magnitude of their role is highly uncertain, dependent on fuel prices and on 
reductions in component costs.  Hybrid sales have grown rapidly since the 1999 
introduction of the Honda Insight.  In the near future, a variety of new hybrid 
systems, from simple stop-start mechanisms to the General Motors/Allison two 
mode full hybrid system, will be introduced to the fleet.  However, the more 
efficient systems currently can pay for themselves with fuel savings only if 
gasoline prices remain high and only for high mileage drivers who spend much 
of their time in urban stop-and-go driving where hybrids maximize their 
efficiency advantage over conventional vehicles.  The key to making them into 
a dominant technology is to shift to lithium ion or other energy storage 
technologies that may be less expensive than current nickel-metal hydride 
batteries (which have limited cost reduction potential because of high nickel 
prices), as well as driving down the cost of their expensive electronic controls. 14 
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Although plug-in hybrids – hybrids with larger batteries and motors, that can 
fuel some of their daily miles with electricity from the grid – are not yet 
commercially available, they might begin to play a role in the new vehicle fleet 
by 2020 if their battery costs are driven down.  Two factors can help accomplish 
this – first, although their batteries are considerably larger than those used in 
today’s hybrids, their battery costs will not scale linearly with their storage 
capacity; and second, batteries will achieve substantial economies of scale as 
production ramps up.  A new report by the California Air Resources Board 
(Kalhammer, 2007) projects that lithium ion batteries capable of 20 mile range 
(about 7 kWh of capacity) would cost about $5,000 at a production  rate of 
20,000 batteries/year and less than $3,000 at a production rate of 
350,000/year.  However, this report’s optimism about the likelihood that these 
batteries can last a vehicle lifetime is controversial. 
Although there will certainly be an argument about what a 2020 “leading 
edge” or top runner midsize passenger car might look like, a reasonable guess 
– assuming a very strong focus on fuel economy, coupled with a very vigorous 
R&D program – might be as follows: 
•  Full hybrid drivetrain, assuming battery and electronics costs are driven 
down sufficiently for hybrids to become fully mainstream; 
•  Curb weight reduced about 20% from today’s cars; 
•  Rolling resistance of the tires at 0.006, compared to about 0.008 for 
today’s mainstream tires; 
•  Aerodynamic drag coefficient 0.22, compared to today’s best-in-class 
0.26 
•  Downsized gasoline engine with full (possibly camless) valve control, 
mode switching from Homogeneous Charge Compression Ignition to 
Atkinson cycle to Otto cycle depending on load, turbocharging and 
perhaps super-charging. 
•  Automated manual transmission. 
A 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study estimated
iv that 
such a car would get about 60 (adjusted) mpg (92 gCO2/km) compared to a 26 
mpg car (212 gCO2/km) in 2001, a 130% improvement; a conventional 
counterpart, without the hybrid drivetrain, would obtain about 42 mpg (131 
gCO2/km), about a 60% improvement (Heywood, 2003).   A more recent MIT 
study (Kromer and Heywood, 2007) used a 2005 Camry 2.5 liter 4-cylinder 
engine as its baseline engine and more sophisticated engine mapping and 
transmission optimization; for a 2030 advanced gasoline vehicle using similar 
assumptions about vehicle load reduction as the 2003 study, it found  
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approximately the same percentage fuel economy improvement for the vehicle 
with a conventional drivetrain and naturally aspirated engine; 82% improvement 
for the same vehicle with a turbocharged (and radically downsized) engine; and 
187% for the vehicle with a parallel hybrid drivetrain.
v   
The 2007 MIT study also examines a 2030 diesel vehicle, but does not 
compare it to a 2005 diesel.  However, the 2030 diesel attains an emission rate 
of 111 gCO2/km (Kromer and Heywood, 2007), which represents about a 55% 
increase in fuel economy over a 2005 diesel with the same characteristics 
(other than the engine) as the 2005 baseline gasoline vehicle.
vi 
3.3.  Adding it up, for the U.S. light-duty fleet 
The availability of NAS-style calculations of “cost effective” fuel economy 
targets and visions of future “top runner” or “leading edge” vehicles won’t add 
up to a certain view of a “correct” fuel economy target, but they are valuable in 
informing a decision about targets.  The suggestion here is to combine the 
perspectives gained from these analyses with a careful consideration of how 
urgently society needs to combat climate change and the economic security 
problems associated with U.S. dependence on an unstable fuel supply.  
Policymakers must also carefully consider their views on consumer freedom of 
choice, because a future shift to faster acceleration capability and increased 
weight (associated with more size or other features) will significantly reduce the 
fleet’s fuel economy improvement potential.  Thus, the NAS-style calculation 
offers a way to get a sense for a conservative view of what an “economically 
rational” consumer might want if she didn’t care about getting a bigger or more 
powerful vehicle – or if policymakers were determined to push the fleet away 
from the “performance race” characteristic of the past 20 years.  On the other 
hand, fleet targets might be more ambitious if automakers could promote 
smaller cars by emphasizing safety and comfort in their design.  Similarly, 
growth in sales of four-wheel and all-wheel drive – which have significant 
weight and fuel economy penalties – might conceivably slow and even reverse 
as the perceived safety and traction advantages of these systems shrink with 
universal penetration of electronic stability control and traction control – which 
do not carry an efficiency penalty.  A reasonable conclusion that could be 
drawn from these considerations is that the type of fuel economy improvement 
goal derived from an NAS-style calculation – about 30-50% improvement over a 
12-15 year period – may be a decent starting point for negotiations.  
Technological optimism and a strong sense of urgency in reducing oil use and 
GHG emissions would tend to push the goal upwards; a hard-headed realism 
about trends in performance and other efficiency-reducing vehicle attributes 
would tend to push in the opposite direction. 16 
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For a longer-term and less conservative perspective, projecting future 
leading edge vehicles provides a good view for what developing technology 
could do for fleet fuel economy.  For the longer-term – say out to 2025 or 2030 
– it makes sense to take a much stronger position towards improving fleet fuel 
economy.   In this time-frame, a doubling of passenger car fleet fuel economy, 
and somewhat less for the light truck fleet (because towing requirements limit 
the benefit of hybrid drivetrains) would be quite possible assuming either strong 
reductions in the cost of hybrid drivetrains or simply the willingness to treat 
reduction in oil use and GHG emissions as societal requirements in the same 
way that reductions in emissions of criteria pollutants are treated.  A more 
conservative goal of a 50-60% improvement would reflect less willingness to 
impose costs on vehicle purchasers and/or less technological optimism. 
An important added consideration will come into play if it becomes 
important for the world to make a strong shift to oil substitutes.  The most 
straightforward substitutes are alternative liquids from unconventional oil 
sources (e.g., tar sands, heavy oil), natural gas, and coal.  These will yield 
substantial increases in “per gallon” emissions of greenhouse gases, and large 
increases in vehicle efficiency will be needed to avoid large increases in total 
emissions.  Biomass liquids can represent a strong alternative if they can be 
obtained from cellulosic materials, but they will provide a large share of 
transport fuel requirements only if fleet efficiency is greatly improved.  And 
hydrogen and electricity have severe onboard fuel storage problems that are 
likely to be solved only if less fuel (or less battery storage capacity) is needed – 
that is, only if overall vehicle efficiency is very high.  In other words, greatly 
increased vehicle efficiency is a crucial requirement if the world needs to move 
dramatically away from its dependency on imported oil. 
3.4.  Application to Europe 
The above discussion is quite applicable to an analysis of new fuel 
economy standards for the European Union, but several adjustments are 
necessary.  The European light-duty fleet and the economic and policy 
environment that affects it have important differences from conditions in the 
United States.  Among the most important differences: 
•  The physical makeup of the European fleet is quite different from the 
U.S. fleet: 
o  Engine power (for vehicles of the same size) tends to be 
considerably lower, on average, in the European fleet 
o  Diesel engines make up close to 50% of new vehicle sales in 
Europe, while light duty diesel sales are negligible in the U.S. 
o  Manual transmissions are the norm in Europe, automatic 
transmissions in the U.S.  
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o  Light trucks are a small part of the new vehicle fleet in Europe, and 
are over half the new vehicle fleet in the U.S. 
•  Fuel prices are far higher in Europe, at about double those in the U.S. 
•  Vehicles are driven more intensively in the U.S. – at about 13,000 
miles/year vs. 7,000-9,000 miles/yr in Europe 
•  Vehicle prices, and the prices of efficiency technologies, in Europe tend 
to be higher than those in the U.S. because of substantial value-added 
taxes 
•  In Europe, a large share of light vehicles is purchased by companies and 
institutions, often to be resold within 2 to 3 years.  According to Kageson 
(2005), company cars comprise 30-50% of new car sales in Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
The higher fuel prices in Europe will tend to make new fuel efficiency 
technologies more cost effective than they would be in the U.S., but this 
advantage is substantially reduced by the lower intensity of use in Europe and 
the somewhat higher prices for the technologies (because of value-added 
taxes). 
The technology differences between Europe and the U.S. should reduce 
somewhat the short-term improvement potential for the European fleet.  Manual 
transmissions already are substantially more efficient than automatics, so the 
improvement potential of continuously variable transmissions and improved 
automatic transmissions is significantly lower in the European fleet; however, 
there remains some efficiency potential for manual transmissions in moving 
towards 6-speed transmissions from current 5-speeds.  Also, the improvement 
potential of the current generation of direct injected diesels in the European 
fleet is lower than the potential for gasoline engines. 
Ricardo has projected that a baseline 2003 diesel car could obtain a CO2 
emissions (and fuel consumption) reduction of about one third by shifting to a 
mild hybrid drivetrain (integrated starter-alternator with motor assist, similar to 
the Honda system used in its Civic), advanced transmission, and substantially 
downsized engine at a cost of about 3,000 euros; at a lower cost of about 1300 
euros, a 23% emissions/consumption reduction could be obtained with a 42 volt 
belt hybrid, advanced transmission, and a lesser degree of engine downsizing 
(Owen and Gordon, 2003).  Other measures such as weight reduction, 
improved aerodynamics, and low friction tires could reduce emissions and oil 
consumption further.  The implication is that a fleet CO2 emissions rate target of 
130 g/km, and probably 120 g/km as well, is obtainable; the real issue is how to 
structure a standard that can achieve the target in a manner that doesn’t distort 
the market, and how to define a reasonable timetable for attainment. 18 
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4.  THE STRUCTURE OF A NEW STANDARD 
The economic impacts of a new standard, and perhaps even its fuel 
economy improvement potential, will depend not only on the stringency of the 
standard (the MPG target) but also on its structure – the method by which fuel 
economy targets are distributed among competing manufacturers, and the 
boundaries and definitions that identify the types of vehicles to be regulated.  
Some examples of regulatory structures currently in use are: 
•  Application of a single target to all passenger cars in each automaker’s 
fleet, regardless of size or other attributes (U.S. passenger cars) 
•  Identification of a target as an average for the entire fleet of vehicles 
manufactured by all automakers (EU Voluntary Agreement, though 
applied separately to European manufacturers, Japanese manufacturers, 
and Korean manufacturers) 
•  Identification of targets based on vehicle attributes, e.g. weight (Japan, 
China) or “footprint” (wheelbase * track width, U.S. light trucks) 
Another important aspect of regulatory structure is the extent to which 
manufacturers can average the fuel economy achieved by each vehicle type 
across their fleets.  Currently, no standard allows trading of credits (obtained by 
overshooting fuel economy targets) among different automakers (although the 
Voluntary Agreement implicitly does this, by requiring only the achievement of a 
target across multiple companies), and there are different schemes for trading 
within each manufacturer’s fleet. The U.S. allows full averaging within each of 
three groups of vehicles (domestic passenger cars, imported passenger cars, 
light trucks) for each automaker.  Japan allows averaging within a 
manufacturer’s fleet, but credits for topping a target in one weight class are 
reduced by half when applied to another weight class.  And China demands 
compliance for every weight class, with no averaging between classes. 
Opponents of U.S. fuel economy standards have long complained about 
the various market distortions that the current standards appear to have 
created, including: 
•  The virtual elimination of the station wagon, and its replacement by 
minivans and sports-utility vehicles that provide similar utility but 
generally obtain lower fuel economy;  
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•  The advent of very large SUVs whose weight puts them outside of 
the light-duty fleet (as defined by the regulation), and free from 
CAFE standards. 
•  The movement of larger (3/4 and 1 ton) pickup trucks over the CAFE 
weight limits. 
•  Among the “Big Three” U.S. manufacturers, pricing of some small 
car models that appeared to be below production cost. 
•  Deliberate foreign sourcing of key components of some full-size cars 
and their resulting inclusion into the “import” fleet. 
These distortions appear to have little to do with the stringency of the 
standards, and much to do with their structure, particularly the separation of 
passenger cars and light trucks with very different fuel economy targets (the 
light truck target is far more lenient); the separation of “domestic” and “import” 
fleets, each of which must meet the assigned targets; and the assignment of a 
uniform fuel economy target to every automaker regardless of the mix of 
vehicles they produced.  For example, the car/truck separation, with light trucks 
having a much lower standard (20.2 mpg vs. 27.5 mpg for cars) produced a 
strong incentive for automakers to find a way to move its least efficient 
passenger cars into the light truck fleet.  This incentive should not take sole 
responsibility for the rise of strong markets for minivans and SUVs, however – 
minivans turned out to be extraordinarily attractive vehicles for suburban 
families, and SUVs were terrific for the automakers’ bottom lines – the early 
SUVs were relatively simple modifications of pickup trucks, relatively 
inexpensive to manufacture, and could be priced at a large premium to their 
manufacturing cost.  
Many of the problems of the current U.S. system could be overcome by 
eliminating separate domestic and import fleets (which are an anachronism in 
an age of multinational automakers), insuring that artificial weight ceilings do 
not allow vehicles to escape from compliance, and moving away from uniform 
standards to standards based on the attributes of each automaker’s fleet, as 
long as the attributes are reasonably related to vehicles’ fuel economy potential.  
The central idea of attribute-based standards is that they provide individual fleet 
targets to each automaker that reflect the degree of difficulty faced by that 
automaker in order to comply with the standard.  This can greatly reduce a 
problem associated with the current standards – that manufacturers of small 
vehicles may be able to comply with the standard without any action to improve 
efficiency design and technology, while manufacturers of larger vehicles, or a 
mix of vehicles, may have to take strong measures for compliance.  It also may 
allow combining car and light truck fleets, because such a standard can shrink 20 
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the difference in “degree of difficulty” in compliance faced by cars and light 
trucks– the primary reason for keeping the fleets separate.   Note that 
policymakers might find it politically impossible to set standards that some 
domestic manufacturers could not comply with – so that attribute-based 
standards, by evening out the degree of difficulty faced by different 
manufacturers, can allow policymakers to set a more stringent standard than 
would be possible if the standard demanded the same target for each 
manufacturer. 
The attribute most closely related to fuel economy is vehicle weight, and 
Japanese and Chinese fuel economy standards are weight-based standards 
(that is, automakers producing larger, heavier vehicles have lower fuel 
economy targets than automakers making primarily small, lighter vehicles).   
Studies of the U.S. passenger car fleet show that the relationship between curb 
weight and vehicle fuel consumption is quite strong; Figure 1 shows a plot of 
fuel consumption, in gallons/100 miles, versus curb weight in pounds, for the 
1999 U.S. new passenger car fleet.  The strength of the correlation implies that 
a weight-based standard is likely to be reasonably uniform in the degree-of-
difficulty it applies to a diverse set of automakers (although some companies 
that stress high-powered sports cars would tend to face a more severe test with 
this type of standard – or virtually any other).  Further, although certain 
characteristics of light trucks (for example, their boxy shape) tend to make them 
less fuel-efficient than passenger cars of equal weight, the difference is not 
especially strong – Figure 2 shows the fuel consumption vs. curb weight 
correlation line of the 1999 U.S. light truck fleet superimposed on the passenger 
car plot.  As seen in the figure, a fuel consumption standard applied to both 
fleets combined seems practical.  
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Fuel Consumption, gallons/100 miles vs. Curb Weight,
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An important shortcoming of weight-based standards, however, is that they 
tend to reduce or eliminate weight reduction as a strategy for compliance – 22 
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since reducing weight, while improving fuel economy, will make the vehicle’s 
fuel economy target more stringent, with no net regulatory benefit to the 
company if the targets are set in proportion to the correlation trendline.  Weight 
reduction can be an important component of fuel economy improvement – 
obviously, since fuel economy and weight are so strongly correlated.  Thus, 
weight-based standards limit the degree of improvement that a new standard 
can demand.  Although fuel economy targets based on vehicle weight can be 
set to provide some incentive to reduce weight – by deliberately reducing the 
stringency of standards for lighter-weight vehicles – the effectiveness of this 
measure will be limited by the need to avoid severe market distortions.  
In setting new standards for U.S. light trucks, NHTSA chose standards 
based on vehicle “footprint” – track width multiplied by wheelbase.  Footprint is 
much less closely correlated with fuel economy than is vehicle weight – in 
statistical terms, a plot of fuel economy vs. weight for the 1999 passenger car 
fleet (Plotkin, Greene, and Duleep, 2002) had an R
2 of about 60%, versus about 
37% for footprint (see Figure 3).  However, footprint is attractive as the basis of 
a standard because it preserves the incentive to reduce weight; it resists 
distortion -- any tendency to increase either track width or wheelbase will be 
limited by the need to essentially redesign the vehicle (not the case with 
weight); and because increasing either of these dimensions would tend to be 
beneficial to vehicle safety.  Wider track width will reduce a vehicle’s potential to 
roll over, and a longer wheelbase may provide more space for crash 
management and improve directional stability. 
Attribute-based standards are favored by some because they tend to 
equalize the degree of difficulty of meeting fuel economy targets among 
competing manufacturers regardless of the size mix of vehicles they produce.  
This feature of attribute-based standards may not, however, be seen as a 
positive factor by all groups.  Vehicle mix is an important determinant of fleet 
fuel efficiency, and many would like to exert pressure on manufacturers to shift 
their mix towards smaller, more efficient vehicles.  Uniform standards such as 
those in the United States do exert such pressure, while attribute-based 
standards do not.  However, there is no evidence that the U.S. standards have 
been effective in pushing the fleet mix towards smaller vehicles, and little 
expectation that such a standard, if applied in Europe, would succeed in 
significantly changing the mix there either. 
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Figure 6-9.  Fuel economy vs. wheelbase*width, 
1999 cars>5,000 sales
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5.  TIMING OF A NEW STANDARD 
The question of when fuel economy targets must be achieved is as 
important as how stringent the targets should be.  Companies adopting a new 
technology will have to go through a product development process to fit the 
technology to its vehicles, and will want to introduce the technology cautiously – 
introducing it into a limited number of models, gauging its performance over a 
few years, and then – if the introduction is successful – rolling it gradually into 
the fleet as model redesigns are scheduled.  Product development will take at 
least 2 or 3 years, after the technology is deemed ready to leave the laboratory.  
Proving the product after its initial introduction (in a limited number of models – 
sometimes just one) will take another 2 to 3 years.  And spreading the 
technology across the company’s fleet will likely take a minimum of 5 more 
years. 24 
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Companies adopting a commercial technology may shrink this timeline, but 
the degree to which they can move more quickly depends on a number of 
factors, including overall industry experience, whether the technology is an “add 
on” component or must be carefully integrated into vehicle systems, and 
whether the technology is owned by a competing automaker or else by a 
supplier capable of providing extensive design consulting. 
Translating the above into a schedule for moving multiple technologies into 
the fleets of multiple vehicle manufacturers is not straightforward, and there 
does not appear to be much literature on the issue of scheduling for fuel 
economy standards.  Nevertheless, it appears that regulators should allow 
about 10 to 12 years for a standard with targets based on technology already 
introduced into the commercial marketplace, with more time allocated for 
rigorous targets requiring redesigns that might strongly test consumer 
preferences – assuming that the targets are based on an underlying 
assumption that the entire fleet of new vehicles is extensively redesigned.  
Shorter periods would be reasonable for intermediate targets that could be 
satisfied with redesign of only a fraction of the fleet or with less extensive 
changes to most models. 
The EU faces a somewhat different challenge from the one that faces the 
U.S., which currently is debating standards that would presumably require 
redesign of the entire fleet over a time period of 12 years or more.  The 
European industry clearly will not achieve the 140 g/km CO2 target set for 2008, 
and current discussion of a target for 2012 focuses on 130 g/km, a 13% 
reduction in emissions (or 15% increase in fuel economy) if the industry 
emissions average is around 150 g/km for the 2008 model year (as predicted 
by Kageson, 2005).  This is a quite ambitious target for such a short time 
period; although a fleetwide target of a 15% fuel economy improvement 
probably could be achieved with a redesign of about half of each 
manufacturer’s fleet and an attribute-based system that narrowed the 
differences in degree-of-difficulty among competing automakers, four years is a 
short period to achieve such a redesign.  On the other hand, some have argued 
that the industry has been well aware for a number of years that greater effort 
at fuel economy improvement is required and has failed to take adequate 
measures to achieve the current 2008 target.  
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6.  ON-ROAD VERSUS TESTED FUEL ECONOMY 
As currently structured, fuel economy standards will improve the tested fuel 
economy of the vehicle fleet.  The actual onroad fuel economy of the fleet will 
tend to follow the direction of these tests, but with important differences that 
should be understood in considering new standards. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency fuel economy tests involve 
operating the vehicle on a dynamometer – sort of a treadmill for cars – while a 
driver uses the accelerator and brake to match a speed/time profile called a 
driving cycle.  There are two profiles on the test, a relatively slow cycle 
designed to simulate city driving, and a faster one designed to simulate 
highway driving.  However, partly because of the limited capabilities of 
dynamometers at the time the tests were designed, both driving cycles are 
“gentle” cycles with modest rates of acceleration and braking, and the highway 
cycle never tops 60 mph.  The tests are conducted with heating, air 
conditioning, lights, and other accessories turned off, and the temperature is 
held at 68-86 
0F.  To obtain an “average” fuel economy, it is assumed that 55% 
of driving is on the city cycle and 45% on the highway cycle, with the average 
calculated by applying these weights to the vehicle’s fuel consumption (the 
inverse of fuel economy) on the cycles. 
EPA quickly discovered that the test gave fuel economy values that were 
considerably higher than drivers were actually obtaining, and using the data 
available at the time, reduced the city test result by 10% and the highway result 
by 22% for the fuel economy estimates actually communicated to consumers.  
The value calculated this way is the one that appears on the window sticker of 
new cars and light trucks.  However, even this adjusted fuel economy has 
proved to be optimistic for most drivers,
vii especially as congestion has spread, 
highway speeds have increased, and air conditioning has become almost 
universal.  EPA has instituted new requirements for the “window sticker values” 
on new cars to be based on a series of 5 driving cycles, some of which are 
driven with air conditioning on or at cold temperatures (20
oF), some of which 
duplicate driving that is considerably faster (up to 80 mph) and more aggressive 
(2.5 times the acceleration on the original tests) than the original 2 cycles.  This 
new method is expected to reduce estimated city fuel economy values by an 
average of 12% (and maximum drop of 30%), and highway values by 8% (25% 
maximum) (Edmunds, 2007). 
Although there remain doubts about whether the new testing series will 
yield accurate results, they will at least take some account of measures that 
manufacturers can take to improve “real world” fuel economy but that will not 
make a difference on the formal 2-cycle test.  For example, improving the 26 
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efficiency of the air conditioning system, insulating the vehicle, or adding 
special coatings to the windows to reduce heat gain during the summer will all 
improve actual fuel economy but will be ignored by the 2-cycle test.  In other 
words, automakers that incorporate energy-saving designs that won’t “count” on 
the test will at least be rewarded by having the benefits of these measures 
appear on the sticker. 
If new standards are formulated, this modest incentive could be 
strengthened by awarding credits towards satisfying the standards for the 
“invisible” technologies and designs.  Although it might seem more logical to 
simply change the official test driving cycles to accurately reflect these factors, 
such a change is problematic without considerably more confidence in the new 
tests. 
Europeans face precisely the same issue regarding the difference between 
tested fuel economy and actual onroad values.  The New European Duty Cycle 
(NEDC) used to test fuel economy is a bit slower than the U.S. combined 
city/highway cycle but is similar, including its failure to include air conditioning 
loads. 
7.  MAINTAINING FUEL ECONOMY “AFTER THE SALE” 
Fuel economy standards generally have been aimed at new vehicles, and 
have not tried to affect what happens to vehicles after they are sold. 
Vehicle fuel economy can degrade significantly after a vehicle is sold.  
Some of the causes are:  
•  Underinflation of tires, which increases rolling resistance (and, because 
the added resistance causes more tire heating, can adversely affect 
safety) 
•  Replacement tires generally are less efficient than original equipment 
tires.  Automakers have a strong incentive to install high efficiency tires to 
maximize reported fuel economy values.  There is no rating system for 
tire efficiency, however, and no way for the vehicle owner to know the 
added “price,” in increased fuel costs, of a less efficient replacement. 
•  Poorly maintained vehicles will lose fuel economy through loss of engine 
efficiency.  
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•  Added weight from heavy materials left in the trunk add to inertial losses, 
and vehicle body add-ons such as ski and bicycle racks add weight and 
reduce aerodynamic efficiency 
•  Driving style greatly affects fuel economy – as noted previously, 
aerodynamic loads grow with the square of velocity, so high speed 
driving can be very inefficient, and rapid acceleration and failure to stay 
even with the flow of traffic – demanding frequent braking and 
acceleration -- also reduces fuel economy. 
Technology requirements can address some of these issues.  
Requirements for automakers to incorporate tire safety warning systems should 
reduce the incidence of severely underinflated tires; however, the current U.S. 
requirements do not demand actual measurements of tire pressure, so mild 
underinflation is unlikely to be affected. 
Efficiency requirements for tires may be regulatory overkill, but NHTSA or 
EPA (and the EU for Europe) could try to develop a tire efficiency rating and 
labeling system that communicated the likely value of excess fuel use over the 
tires’ lifetime.   
Another possibility is to give a fuel economy credit to vehicles that 
incorporate real-time fuel economy indicators on their vehicles’ dashboards.  
U.S., European, and Japanese studies have indicated that fuel economy 
improvements on the order of 10% or more can be obtained if drivers are aware 
of the effects of their driving style on efficiency and adjust their driving 
accordingly (ECCJ 2003, ECMT/IEA 2005).  Similarly, policymakers might 
consider awarding credits for “economy” switches for automatic transmissions 
that optimize shift points for fuel savings – although driver use of such switches 
should be studied to verify their value.  
Vehicle inspection systems tied to emissions and safety should tend to 
reduce some of the maintenance problems, but these inspections are limited in 
geographic coverage and may be a difficult sell, politically.  And convincing 
vehicle owners to remove unnecessary material from trunks and dismantle 
detachable vehicle racks when not in use may be difficult, though it certainly is 
worth an information campaign to communicate just how much fuel these 
changes can save. 28 
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8.  COMPLEMENTARY POLICIES 
Vehicle purchasers generally can choose among a wide range of features 
that affect fuel economy and CO2 emissions, both across the fleet and within 
individual vehicle categories and even specific models.  These features include 
vehicle size, fuel type (diesel or gasoline), engine power (with the same model, 
there usually are two or more engine options), type of transmission, luxury 
accessories, choice of 2-wheel or 4-wheel drive, etc.  Unless vehicle 
manufacturers sharply restrict consumer choice, satisfaction of fuel economy 
and CO2 emissions CO2 emissions standards depends on both the 
manufacturers’ design and technology choices and on consumer purchasing 
decisions favorable to vehicle efficiency.  Consequently, the market 
environment influencing vehicle choice decisions – fuel prices, consumer 
knowledge, vehicle sales taxes and registration fees, advertising, etc. – will play 
an important role in determining the degree of difficulty faced by vehicle 
manufacturers in complying with these standards. 
A key criticism of U.S. standards has been that they exist in a policy 
environment distinctly unfavorable to consumers’ choice of improved efficiency 
– with low fuel prices and sales and annual taxes that do not distinguish 
between efficient and inefficient vehicles.  
In Europe, a variety of policies exist that would be complementary to new 
fuel economy standards, in that they share the basic aim of promoting higher 
efficiency vehicles.  Kageson (2003) has cataloged these policies: 
•  Fuel taxes – which are quite high in EU countries, and clearly have an 
effect on vehicle fuel economy.  Because diesel fuel taxes are 
considerably lower than taxes on gasoline in the majority of EU countries, 
sales of (more efficient) diesel vehicles have soared, with subsequent 
improvements in fleet fuel economy (and reductions in CO2 
emissions/km).  Kageson has noted a potential concern with the 
diesel/gasoline price differential – that the rebound effect (increase in 
driving caused by more efficient vehicles’ lower driving cost/km) has 
appeared to be quite strong in shifts to diesel vehicles, with apparent 
increases in vehicle kilometers driven for diesel vehicles.  Whether this 
effect is as strong as portrayed is uncertain, however, because drivers 
who would ordinarily take longer trips, or who are contemplating a shift in 
driving habits towards greater driving, would tend to prefer diesel 
vehicles, and, in a multi-vehicle household, a new diesel vehicle might 
absorb some of the trips of other vehicles in the household.  These 
effects make it difficult to separate out a “rebound” from a preference for 
diesels among higher-mileage drivers.  
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•  Annual circulation taxes based on engine power, cylinder capacity, 
vehicle weight, and fuel consumption.  Kageson argues that  these 
taxes have generally been too low to affect market preferences 
significantly; however, increases in these taxes could be effective in 
supporting fuel economy standards.  The form of the taxes is important – 
fuel consumption (or CO2 emissions CO2 emissions) as a basis should 
provide the most direct support of standards, weight and power 
somewhat less so.  Basing taxes on cylinder capacity would help some; 
wide use of such taxes would likely tend to promote highly boosted 
engines and manufacturer focus on increasing engine power density 
(kW/cc), which should tend to reduce fuel consumption. 
•  Sales and registration taxes based on cylinder capacity (Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) and fuel consumption 
(Austria).  Kageson also mentions taxes based on power and weight but 
does not identify any.  Because purchasers of many new vehicles will not 
keep them more than a few years, these taxes should be more effective 
than annual circulation taxes in affecting buyer decisions about vehicle 
fuel efficiency. 
It might be argued that fuel economy standards should by adequate by 
themselves to boost fuel economy to desired levels, since standards require 
compliance.  The obvious counterargument is that economic incentives that 
align consumer interests with the vehicle manufacturers’ responsibilities under 
standards make ambitious standards politically feasible.  The risk that lack of 
consumer interest might damage a vital industry would likely limit government 
support for such standards.  Further, continued improvements in vehicle 
efficiency will demand substantial and continuing investments in new 
technology that can only be made by a financially healthy industry.  
9.  CONCLUSIONS 
The process of developing new fuel economy standards is inherently more 
complex than can be done justice in a short paper.  The timing of standards 
was discussed only briefly here, but timing is clearly a crucial element of any 
new standard – redesigning vehicles is a time-intensive and very expensive 
process that requires large engineering teams. Redesigning the large part of 
the new vehicle fleet will require at least a decade, and automakers must 30 
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proceed cautiously in introducing new technologies to avoid maintenance and 
operational disasters.  Another issue not discussed in depth here is the 
economic impact of new standards.  In the past, economic analyses of 
proposed standards have tended to follow a common script – the industry and 
its consultants forecast huge negative impacts, the environmental community 
forecasts large positive impacts.  In all cases, the results flow primarily from the 
input assumptions, not robust analysis – the automakers tends to assume that 
consumers will resist purchasing new models or that they will have to shift to 
less profitable market segments, while the environmental community assumes 
that sales will remain robust and the greater vehicle content will generate new 
jobs (OTA, 1991).  And as noted, safety has been and will be a crucial factor in 
negotiations about new standards in the U.S., and the subject is complex 
enough to deserve its own paper. 
The decision-making process that will create new fuel economy standards 
is intensely political, and it should be.  Scientific analysis can define the 
possibilities, but in the end the process is about trading off competing societal 
values – the relative importance of global warming and energy security 
concerns, the value of the free market, the ability of consumers to drive 
whatever kind of vehicle they want, the value of future savings versus present 
costs.  Scientists can inform this process, but they should not rule it.  Further, 
as anyone who has watched this debate over the years knows intensely well, 
there are strongly variable scientific positions about all of the issues in the 
debate.  What does seem certain, however, is that the extremes of the debate – 
that fuel economy standards don’t work and don’t save fuel, or that fuel 
economy standards can be cost-free – are both incorrect. 
The extent to which fleet fuel economy can be improved is controlled not 
only by technology but also by consumer desires.  In the United States, over 
the past 20 years, in the absence of more stringent standards, a cascade of fuel 
efficiency technologies have been widely disseminated in the fleet, but their 
potential to improve fuel economy has been totally cancelled by changes in 
vehicle attributes desired by vehicle buyers, especially increased performance, 
larger size, and higher weight (due to both the larger size and increased luxury 
and safety equipment).  Similar trends have occurred in Europe, but there at 
least a portion of the benefits of new technology has gone to improving vehicle 
fuel economy.  The tendency to use new technology for attributes other than 
improved fuel economy can continue in the future.  New standards might 
constrain trends to larger, heavier, more powerful vehicles, but vehicle 
manufacturers (through advertising and design decisions) and government and 
civic leaders (through their ability to inform and influence the public) have a 
strong role to play. 
In the near-term (12-15 years), fuel economy improvement goals of 30-50% 
seem to be a reasonable starting point for negotiations between government 
and industry, though higher values would be possible if governments felt that  
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the urgency of energy security and climate change issues justified asking 
consumers to pay more for new technologies than they would likely save in 
future fuel savings.  In the longer term, considerably higher increases appear 
quite feasible, especially if adverse vehicle attribute trends are stopped and if 
progress continues in cutting the costs of hybrid drivetrains and other new 
technologies. 
In Europe, the approaching decision appears to be a shorter-term one.  
Because it appears that the industry will not achieve the 140 gCO2/km target for 
2008 (or 2009 for the Japanese and Korean automakers), the EU has proposed 
to set mandatory targets, perhaps for as early as 2012.  The EU must make 
difficult decisions about the stringency and timing of the targets as well as their 
format – and the two are related, because a format that places very different 
challenges on different segments of the industry is likely to cause some 
segments to fail or, to avoid this, to limit how stringent the targets can be.  This 
paper examines some alternative formats, but none is without difficult tradeoffs.  
As for timing, policymakers must wrestle with the knowledge that 2012 is very 
early for a demanding redesign of a major portion of the fleet, but at the same 
time it has been clear to the industry for some time that this challenge is 
coming.  There is no simple technical analysis that can simplify this difficult 
political decision.  
As a final point, there are actions that policymakers can take aside from 
new fuel economy standards that can add to overall fleet efficiency and fuel 
savings.  Some of these actions address the limits of current vehicle 
compliance testing and the effect of post-sale consumer decisions on efficiency.  
These actions include: 
•  Developing a measuring system for tire efficiency that could be used for 
labeling or as a framework for standards; 
•  Awarding credits to automakers for improved air conditioning systems 
and other accessories whose efficiency is not measured on the testing 
cycle (A regulatory agency would have to determine a method for 
estimating the average emissions savings associated with such 
accessories and award a credit in relation to the tested fuel economy to 
be factored into the rating of the vehicle in relation to a standard or 
incentive system); 
•  Awarding credits to automakers for onboard fuel economy/consumptions 
displays and possibly for “economy” modes for automatic transmissions. 
Policymakers can also promote economic incentives that are in alignment 
with new standards, such as registration and circulation taxes tied to fuel 32 
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efficiency.  To the extent that such incentives make higher efficiency vehicles 
more attractive to vehicle purchasers, they may significantly reduce the market 
risks to automakers of new standards. 
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APPENDIX 
Box 1.  The tradeoff between fuel economy and other vehicle 
attributes 
This tradeoff between fuel economy and performance is well illustrated by 
examining Toyota’s stable of hybrid electric cars and the different decisions 
made by their designers about trading off fuel economy and performance.  In 
the Prius, Toyota designers chose to use the hybrid technology primarily to 
increase fuel economy.  They use a small, very efficient engine and use the 
added power of the electric motor to achieve performance similar to other 
vehicles in Prius’s size category, with much better fuel economy (city/highway 
fuel economy of 60/51 mpg vs. 30/38 mpg for the smaller Corolla).
viii  In the 
Camry hybrid, the emphasis is still on fuel economy, but the designers chose to 
forgo downsizing the Camry’s 4-cylinder engine, creating performance a bit 
better than the hybrid’s conventional sibling (187 hp vs. 157 hp) but with clearly 
superior fuel economy (40/38 mpg vs. 24/33 mpg for the conventional 4-
cylinder with automatic transmission).  And in the Lexus GS450h, the designers 
pushed the tradeoff considerably more towards performance (5.2 second 0-60 
mph, vs. 5.7 seconds for the GS 350 with the same engine), creating an ultra-
powerful luxury car with fuel economy comparable to or a bit better than a less 
powerful car of the same size (25/28 mpg vs. 21/29 mpg for the GS 350).
ix 
In the U.S., the tradeoff between fuel economy and other vehicle attributes 
has delivered a 2007 model year fleet of cars and light trucks that, over the past 
20 years, has added a staggering array of fuel efficiency technologies including 
supercomputer design of vehicle body structures coupled with new lightweight 
materials and higher strength steels; significant improvement in aerodynamics 
and tires; new engine technology ranging from valves that adjust their timing 
and lift (degree of opening) in response to changing power demand, to fuel 
injection systems that can respond instantly to changes in cylinder conditions 
monitored by sophisticated sensors and controlled by more onboard computer 
power than was available in the lunar module.  And the net effect of this 
technology on fleet fuel economy has been…….zero.  Every bit of fuel 
economy potential represented by this technology has been traded away for 
other things.  There is no ideal way to measure the impact of this tradeoff, but 
using a simple measure – “how efficient would the fleet have been had it 
remained at the average acceleration performance and weight of the 1987 
fleet? – the EPA has concluded that the tradeoff “cost” of the years 1987-2004 
has been about 5.5 mpg, or 22.5%,  for the combined car/light truck fleet  
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(Hellman and Heavenrich, 2004).
x  Figure B-1 shows the changes in average 
vehicle weight, 0-60 mph time, and percent of manual transmissions from 1981 
to 2006 for the U.S. new passenger car fleet.   
Figure B-1.  Changes in passenger car attributes, U.S. new car fleet, 
1981-2006 
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Similar trends have occurred in European vehicle markets.  From 1990 to 
2003, average power for all light vehicles increased by nearly 30%, from 61 to 
79 kW, while the share of 4-wheel drive vehicles tripled, from 2.6 to 6.3% of 
sales.
xi  Average vehicle weight also increased substantially, with the ACEA 
reporting an increase of 10% during the period.
xii  However, the European fleet 
was able to sustain a reduction in average carbon emissions during this period, 
compared to the U.S. fleet’s small increase in average emissions.  A key 
difference between the U.S. and European fleets appears to be the large 
increase in diesel share in the European fleet, from 13.8% in 1990 to 43.7% in 
2003.  This accounted for about a third of the fleet’s emission improvement; the 
remainder of the improvement was primarily due to other technical 
improvements, with changes in vehicle size mix playing a small share (for the 
ACEA, the primary source of vehicles in the EU, dieselization accounted for a 
3.8% emissions reduction, other technical improvements accounted for an 8.3% 
reduction, and mix shift 0.3%.
xiii  Still, a substantial further reduction in 
emissions would have occurred – according to a cited ACEA study, the 
approximately 12% reduction between 1995 and 2003 could have doubled – 
had weight, power, and other vehicle attributes not changed.
xiv 38 
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Box 2.  A short primer on vehicle energy use 
All fuel saving technology is designed either to reduce the power needed at 
the wheels to move the vehicle and  power to run accessories, or to improve 
the efficiency by which the vehicle obtains power from its energy source – 
generally gasoline or diesel fuel. 
Vehicles need energy to provide the power at the wheels needed:  
to overcome the force of inertia when they accelerate either from rest to a 
desired speed or from one speed to a higher one; 
to overcome the forces of air drag and tire friction that would otherwise slow 
it down; and 
to overcome the force of gravity when climbing a grade.  
Energy is also needed to power the accessories that maintain comfort (air 
conditioning, heating), provide entertainment (radio, CD player), or enhance 
safety (lighting). 
Ignoring accessories for the moment, the forces a vehicle needs to 
overcome vary a great deal with the type of driving one does.  On the highway, 
air drag is especially important because the energy/mile needed to overcome it 
varies with the square of speed – air drag at 70 mph is (70/35)
2, or four times 
what it is at 35 mph.  The energy required to overcome tire friction (“rolling 
resistance”) is relatively constant with speed (though it does go up a bit at 
higher speeds) but varies directly with vehicle weight.  And inertial forces, which 
also vary directly with weight, are a function of changes in speed – they’ll be 
low on a smoothly flowing freeway, and high if there’s lots of slowing down and 
speeding up. 
In the city, you’re mostly going at slower speeds and air drag is low.  Tire 
resistance is just a bit lower than it was on the highway.  But every time you 
stop at a red light or slow down for traffic and then accelerate, you’re 
overcoming inertia – so inertial forces are high in city driving.     
What this means is that weight reduction is an excellent way to reduce the 
energy needed by a vehicle, because weight is directly proportional to two of 
the three primary sources of energy use in driving (inertial losses and tire rolling 
resistance).   If a vehicle designer achieves a weight reduction of 10% and 
maintains constant performance by using a slightly smaller engine, fuel 
economy will be improved by about 6-7%, measured by the standard EPA fuel 
economy test, which assumes that 55% of driving is in the city and 45% on the 
highway, all of it fairly gentle.
xv  Improving the efficiency of tires and 
aerodynamic performance by the same 10% is less effective but will still  
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achieve about 2 % increases in fuel economy for each (again, maintaining 
constant performance and measured on the EPA test).  
Improving the efficiency of accessories will also help improve fuel economy, 
although much of this improvement will not show up on the EPA test, which 
does not include use of heating, air conditioning, lights, or entertainment 
systems.  A 10% reduction in accessory energy use could improve fuel 
economy by about 1%.  
As noted above, the other way to improve fuel economy is to improve the 
efficiency with which the vehicle translates fuel energy into power at the wheels.  
An average passenger car or light truck powered by a gasoline engine loses 
more than 80% of its fuel energy between its fuel tank and its wheels in typical 
driving.  The most losses come inside of the engine, through friction of air and 
fuel pumped through tubes and valves (“pumping losses”), friction of moving 
surfaces (e.g., pistons against cylinder walls), heat losses through cylinder 
walls, loss of heat in the exhaust, fuel used to keep the engine running during 
idling and deceleration, and so forth.  Some of these losses arise because of 
design compromises caused by material limits, requirements of emission 
controls,
xvi and limits to measuring capability and allowable complexity in engine 
adjustments.   
Engine efficiency also depends on the transmission.  Internal combustion 
engines can generate the power and torque needed to operate the vehicle at a 
wide variety of engine speeds; the transmission chooses the “best” speed as a 
compromise among fuel consumption, vibration, and other factors, but is limited 
in its choice by the number of speeds in the transmission.  This limitation is 
particularly important because engine efficiency can fall off substantially as the 
engine moves away from its most efficient operating mode.  The more speeds 
in the transmission, the easier it is to keep the engine operating near its most 
efficient mode. 
Finally, engines, especially gasoline engines, operate most efficiently at 
high loads, that is, when the power demanded from them is a substantial 
fraction of their maximum power.  However, engines are “sized” to satisfy 
driving conditions such as accelerating from zero to sixty mph or from 50 to 70 
mpg (highway passing) that require far more power than what is needed during 
average driving.  In other words, engines are normally operated at a small 
fraction of their maximum power, with substantial penalties in efficiency.  This 
opens up a strategy to improve fuel economy – find a way to artificially boost 
the power of a small engine for the limited time high power is needed, through 
turbocharging or supercharging (or use of the electric motor in a hybrid system), 
or to shut down part of the engine at lower loads so that it behaves like a lower-
powered one. 40 
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Although most losses occur in the engine, friction losses occur in the 
transmission and elsewhere in the driveline.  Friction losses are reduced by 
improving engine oils, by making moving parts lighter, by substituting rolling 
surfaces for sliding ones, by developing special coatings for moving parts, and 
by improving manufacturing tolerances. 
NOTES 
 
 
1.  Discussed in Gerard and Lave, 2003.  
2.  In other words, the last increment of added technology cost will be more than balanced 
by added fuel savings.  Note that it might be possible to add technology to gain still 
higher fuel economy without having total added vehicle costs exceed total fuel 
savings….but the cost of the added technology might exceed the fuel savings 
associated with that technology.  
3.  For more information, see the Vehicle Technologies Program website, 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/index.html. The 50 percent weight 
reduction would be available for use in a leading edge vehicle; the 2015 date does not 
assume that the new vehicle fleet could achieve such gains at this time.  
4.  Using the ADVISOR vehicle simulation model, developed by the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory. 
5.  The 2030 midsized passenger cars obtained 5.5 L/100km for the naturally aspirated engine with 
conventional drivetrain; 4.84 L/100km for the turbocharged version; and 3.08 L/100km for the 
hybrid version.  In CO2 terms, these values are 121 g/km; 106 g/km; and 68 g/km. 
 
6.  Assuming the baseline 2005 diesel achieves a 35% higher volumetric fuel economy 
than the gasoline vehicle. 
7.  Fuel economy is extremely sensitive to driving styles – how gently one brakes and accelerates, 
how much the driver anticipates speed changes and avoids unnecessary braking – and the type 
of driving she does.  As a result, multiple drivers using the same vehicle model typically will get a 
wide range of fuel economy results.  Other factors that affect fuel economy results are average 
temperature and accessory use.  Fuel economy values typically drop substantially in severely 
cold weather, for example. 
 
8.  Toyota, 2007.  Corporate website http://www.toyota.com 
9.  Lexus, 2007.  Corporate website, http://www.lexus.com  
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10. Hellman, C.H. and Heavenrich, R.M., 2004.  Light-Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel 
Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2004, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,  
 EPA420-R-04-001 
 
11. P.  Kageson,  Reducing CO2 Emissions from New Cars, European Federation for 
Transport and Environment, 2005. 
12. Kageson, op.cit. 
13. Kageson, op.cit. 
14. Kageson, op. it. 
15.  A key reason that the test driving cycle is so gentle is that the testing machines – 
dynamometers – available at the time the test was established had limited capacity to 
simulate more aggressive driving. 
17.  Because of extremely precise fuel control and advanced catalysts, most fuel economy 
penalties associated with emission controls have disappeared. However, stringent 
standards for nitrogen oxides have led to avoidance of the use of lean burn in gasoline 
engines, which creates an efficiency loss, and new standards for diesels may also 
cause some loss in fuel efficiency.  